The draft proposal on Civil Service Structural Reforms for National Integration and Administrative Efficiency, which is circulating among civil service groups, conveys the mistaken impression of cohesion and merit. Yet its practical effect is to reserve key provincial postings — such as the Deputy Commissioner, Commissioner, and Administrative Secretary — for the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), while consigning the Provincial Management Service (PMS) to a secondary track. Far from integrating, the arrangement entrenches hierarchy and risks deepening the very divides it claims to bridge.

At its core, the draft allows PMS officers to access top-rated roles only after clearing a mid-career examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. This filter is not about competence but exclusivity. In a post-18th Amendment federal arrangement, where provinces are constitutionally empowered, such a requirement is regressive. It reinforces the impression of inherent PAS superiority — a position neither substantiated by law nor backed by administrative logic or experience — and diminishes the standing of provincial cadres in their own provinces.

The asymmetry is most visible in the field, particularly in district-level postings. By the time they reach Grade-18, PMS officers have often spent nearly a decade serving across four or five, if not more, districts within the province, developing an intimate grasp of its administration, political culture, and governance challenges. In addition, they have rotated through the provincial secretariat, acquiring experience in desk work, rules of business, and office procedures. PAS officers, by contrast, begin their careers outside their domicile province and return only upon promotion to Grade-18. When they do, they are largely unfamiliar with the province’s administrative style and cultural context. Having had little or no secretariat exposure, they also tend to lag in basic office management skills (noting, drafting etc.) that are essential for policy processing and governance continuity. Accordingly, to reserve the highest field postings for them while requiring PMS officers to “qualify” through an additional filter is not only counterintuitive but also corrosive to morale.

The requirement that PMS officers inducted into PAS must serve three years outside their home province further illustrates this imbalance. Presently, PAS officers typically serve outside their domicile early in their careers, when family responsibilities are limited. Imposing such mobility on PMS officers at forty-five plus, when obligations are heavier, is more deterrent than integrative. The provision appears carefully crafted to reduce the number of PMS officers who might compete for prestigious assignments. Perhaps the federal service officers’ regular rotation policy could be implemented more effectively, rather than forcing provincial officers, to determine if it truly helps counter provincialism, as the hitherto unknown author of the proposal suggests.

The classification of posts in Cadre Lists A and B compounds the inequity. The draft avoids clarifying whether PAS officers will also remain eligible for List B positions, leaving open the possibility that PAS officers may occupy both sets of posts while PMS officers are restricted. If PMS officers are trusted with pivotal responsibilities as Assistant Commissioners in Grade 17, there is no objective justification for barring them from becoming Deputy Commissioners without first being re-badged into PAS. These reservations are felt across provinces but are particularly pronounced in Punjab, where the imbalances are more acute and PMS efforts to seek redress have been met with persistent indifference. The ‘more-equal’ attitude shows little sign of receding.

سخت دشوار ہے انسان کا مکمّل ہونا

حق و انصاف کی بنیاد پے افضل ہونا

The proposed Provincial Coordination and Management Service (PCMS) is presented as a ‘dignified’ pathway for PMS officers from BS-19 onwards. In practice, however, it risks becoming little more than a repository for non-inducted officers, with limited presence in meaningful service delivery or policy-making. Far from empowering, the design is ornamental — a structure for career progression without substance, effectively sidelining PMS officers from the highest provincial roles.

A rightful reform would take another route. Structural imbalances, which, for all practical purposes, amount to a systematic exploitation of the PMS and have become increasingly crude over the past few years, must be dismantled. Districts and departments should be categorised and postings equitably shared between PAS and PMS, with structured fitness evaluation applied equally at every grade. It should not be the case that Deputy Commissioner positions in Lahore and Rawalpindi (and in some other districts as well, such as Okara) are effectively reserved for PAS. The same applies to key administrative department posts — for instance, Secretary Finance — which should not be treated as the exclusive preserve of one service. The best should also serve in districts and departments that demand greater developmental attention and where service delivery is weaker.

In its present form, the proposal sustains hierarchy rather than rectifying it. The longstanding grievances of PMS officers—delayed promotions, unequal share of posts, and encadrement bottlenecks—remain unaddressed. Real efficiency and integration will come not from reinforcing such imbalances but from dismantling them through transparent, equitable, and merit-based sharing of responsibilities between PAS and PMS. Anything less will entrench the very inequities that already burden provincial governance.